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# **REVIEW ARTICLE**

## XX CENTURY UZBEKISTAN: SOME ISSUES OF STUDY ON THE "COTTON WORK"

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#### ABSTRACT

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#### Keywords:

Union, Autonomy, Republic, law, Socio-Political, Economic, Cultural, "Uzbek Deal", Cotton, Uzbeks. The management of the union and autonomous republics, their rights, social, political, economic, and cultural life was mainly assigned to local leadership cadres, but their activities were inextricably linked with the party, the government of the union, and strict control was established over cadres, lawlessness was created by the group, the highest governing bodies received a lot of statements from unreasonably accused people and their family members. However, these statements and complaints were practically not checked and were sent back to the same Gdlyan group.

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### INTRODUCTION

The socio-economic and political life of Uzbekistan in the 80s of the 20th century went down in history as a "cotton work", and some time later - as an "Uzbek deal". The country was turned into an experimentally experimental area, it was believed that the crisis phenomena that engulfed the post-Soviet space are not connected with the regime that prevailed at that time, but with all sorts of postscript and bribery in society. According to calculations carried out by scientists of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the registry made up 3% of the total volume of products produced in the country. And in the areas of supply of raw materials, these figures were from 5 to 25%. This economic situation of the country was also manifested in other union republics. For example, in 1977, 1075 people were brought to criminal accusations in the Byelorussian SSR. It was established that in the construction organizations of the Leninabad region of the Tajik SSR in 1983-1984 the volume of additions amounted to 700 thousand rubles. And in the Azerbaijan SSR, only in 1983, 667 industrial enterprises and construction organizations were authorized to register. Although in Moldova the registry reached a very high level, officials held even higher management positions (1.118). However, the true essence of all negative vices in the economic and political life of the country has not been studied and disclosed. On the contrary, they were assessed as a national, regional feature associated with the activities of local personnel.

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These circumstances were considered as the main factors contributing to the prosperity of malpractice, bribery and postscript (2.28-29). "Marines", sent to Uzbekistan from the center to restore order and discipline, violating the national interests and cultural values of the Uzbek people, acted without regard for local conditions. As a result, "Uzbekistan has become an experimental field of investigative methods." In a huge country consisting of 15 "union" republics with a population of more than 270 million people, administrativecommand methods of government were strengthened, and each question was solved only by bureaucratic methods. Although raising only the ideological and political level of cadres did not solve anything, the number of administrative institutions and organizations duplicating each other constantly increased, when, as heads of these structures, specially trained for party and Soviet bodies, in solving social and economic issues could not go beyond the instructions center. All this did not allow to quickly and fairly solve such issues as the implementation of structural changes in production, industry and agriculture. According to the available data, in 1965, 29 ministries and equivalent departments were depleted throughout the country, but by the mid-1980s this figure was 160. And the number of people employed in administrative management reached 18 million people. Of these, 1.6 million people worked in high and middle posts of ministries, 11.5 million people - in the management of organizations, 3.5 million people were technical workers and service personnel. For such a huge managerial staff in the country 40 billion rubles or 10% of the state budget were spent annually, they also formed the basis of the administrative-command apparatus (3.580).

In November 1982, Yu.V. Andropov, who took the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee after the death of Leonid Brezhnev, acted as a supporter of strict selection and placement in personnel policy. Based on his many years of experience in the State Security Committee, he was always aware of all events and circumstances regarding the increasingly aggravated crisis in the economic, social and political life of the country, including he was well aware of shortcomings and shortcomings in personnel policy. The report of the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee Yu.V. Andropov at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in June 1983 that the causes of the imminent crisis in the country must be found in personal mistakes and personnel deficiencies, triggered the beginning of the "personnel revolution" and raised the question knowledge of country leaders. In all the periods of the domination of the Soviet state, the policy of personnel selection and their use has always been inextricably linked with the interests and goals of this system. The management of the union and autonomous republics, their rights, social, political, economic, and cultural life was mainly assigned to local leadership cadres, but their activities were inextricably linked with the party, the government of the union, and strict control was established over cadres. Training remained an important task, the decisions of the party were also aimed at addressing this issue. In the literature devoted to this issue, the role of the party in the training of personnel was rated very high. Meanwhile, the prosecution of cadres "unworthy" of their positions began, it was believed that identifying the "guilty" in the impending economic crisis, their party punishment could prevent the problem (4.47).

In 1983, the State Security Committee of the Uzbek SSR opened a criminal case over the head of the OBKHSS of the executive committee of the Bukhara region A. Muzaffarov, who was caught red-handed. The criminal process that began in Uzbekistan in September 1983 was transferred to the USSR Prosecutor's Office. In the same year, by order of the USSR Prosecutor General A.M. Rekunkov, under the direction of the investigator for particularly important cases of the USSR Prosecutor's Office T. Gdlyan, an investigation team of 200 people from different regions of the country is being sent to Uzbekistan. This was the practical beginning of the "cotton work" (5.20-21). The main part of the group consisted of people who do not have special knowledge and experience, despite this, the group was still given great powers and privileges. From the very first days of work, the group followed the path of lawlessness and in the process of investigation used such measures as slander, provocation, falsification of facts, forcing people to give false testimony, and eliminate unwanted people. In the first investigative case of the group in the Bukhara region A.Dustov was denied the title of "police colonel", Sh.A. Rakhimov, A.Muzaffarov, V.V.Mulin - the title of "lieutenant colonel of police", TR Ochilov - the title of "major the militia "(6.268). All investigative criminal cases under the leadership of T. Gdlyan were clearly of an accusatory nature. After physical and moral torture, detainees were forced to admit their "guilt". In this vile way, the investigation team obtained the necessary information from witnesses (7.). Among the illegally arrested persons were mothers of many children, pregnant women, even young children (8.269). As a result of "family arrests," the Gdlyana group created a spiritual atmosphere of fear and horror in the

republic. Persons interrogated during the investigation were not immediately referred to as "guilty", during their visit to the ministry first their achievements were cited as an example, commendable and positive opinions were expressed about their work, and only after that unpleasant words were voiced, says labor veteran M .A.Abduraimov. During the interrogation, they were accused of bribery, they were told that according to Soviet law, all those who spoke to the bribe-takers, gave them bribes and even those who did not give bribes were guilty, demanded that even drivers be interrogated, tell them what their owners were doing while driving in a car (9). During the activities of T.Gdlyan's group in Uzbekistan, 20 senior officials of the USSR and Uzbek SSR Ministries of Internal Affairs, four secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, eight secretaries of regional party committees, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR were charged with bribery and brought to trial. Uzbek SSR, minister of the cotton gin industry of the Uzbek SSR and several other senior officials, a total of 62 persons. Until May 1989, 35 prosecuted persons were brought to court. During 1984-1989, the group of T. Gdlyan considered over 800 "criminal" cases. 600 people from all those brought to justice held leadership positions, 10 people were Heroes of socialist labor. And in 1986 the minister of the cotton-ginning industry of the Uzbek SSR was sentenced to death, which was carried out in 1987 (10.).

It should be particularly noted that the "qualified" investigators involved in the "cotton case", being fascinated by the recovery of plundered wealth, were not interested in the main reasons for additions to the national economy. Employees of the investigation team who did not want to realize the crisis situation in the country, even money seized during a search of the houses of persons brought to justice, were counted among the funds stolen. For example, Kh.Kh. Khalikov, the first secretary of the district committee of the party of the Shahrisabsky district, was accused of receiving a bribe at the expense of adding 4,651,00 rubles to cotton along with S. Dzhurayev. Meanwhile, 3,100,000 rubles from this amount were transferred as a bribe to employees of textile enterprises in Serpukhovo, Kutaisi, Baku, Orekhovo-Zuyevo, and others. For the raw materials they did not receive. Naturally, they could not appropriate such a large amount. On the contrary, they were forced to attribute a non-existent cotton after receiving instructions from above to fulfill the plan. At the same time, they also distributed the received additional funds to dehkans. For example, a group of workers of the Timiryazev collective farm in the Bukinsky district of the Tashkent region was held criminally liable due to the fact that at the time of delivery to the state of the grown crop they had been made "postscripts". However, as indicated in the documents, these people, out of 55,633 rubles, 17 kopecks, received for the attributed 119,863 kg of cotton, 45,395 rubles, 91 kopecks were paid to the collective farmers and tractor drivers as wages (11.176). The fact that in Uzbekistan the investigative group is creating lawlessness, the highest governing bodies received a lot of statements from unreasonably accused people and their family members. However, these statements and complaints were practically not checked and were sent back to the same Gdlyan group. What were the consequences of this, and how the authors of these statements were treated, were not controlled in any way. Thus, the statements and complaints of unjustly arrested people subjected to moral and physical torture, and their family members, were ignored. The number of such statements began to grow precisely since 1983. In 1984 their number was 1212, in 1985 - 1404, in 1986 - 2414, in 1987 - 2147, in 1988 - 2180, in the first quarter of 1989 - 420 (12.1). After the USSR Prosecutor General's Office conducted an investigation on the basis of these letters in 1987, T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov confined themselves to a reprimand. In addition, in 1989, a letter signed by 674 Uzbek workers was sent to the Chairman of the Party Control Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU B.K. Pugo, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.I. Ryzhkov, USSR Prosecutor General A.Yu. Sukharev, to the editors of the Pravda newspapers, "Izvestia", "Literary Gazette". Based on the above, it can be concluded that by the 80s of the twentieth century the registry, bribery, abuse of official position flourished in all the Union republics. In addition, these flaws were the result not only of mistakes and shortcomings made by local management personnel, but also of the administrativecommand system formed in the country in previous years. And the fictional "cotton business" was only a distraction of the Uzbek people from ever-increasing economic crises, by drawing the people's attention to some "guilty" people. In fact, this was the case, the whole country was discussing "big theft" and "bribery" in Uzbekistan. Rallies and demonstrations organized by the Gdlyan group were the focus of attention throughout the country. As a result, in this huge state, created on the basis of an "inviolable union of peoples of different nationalities," the "friendship and fraternity" was forgotten, and all the people of Uzbekistan were condemned by the shame of dependency.

The political leadership that blamed the whole nation turned the "cotton work" into an "Uzbek deal". And when an independent investigation into the "cotton case" began in Uzbekistan, it did not want to fully transfer the case to local leaders and tried to prevent the investigation, to cover the real perpetrators, again to lay all the blame on the Uzbek people.

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